implications of their evidence have broad relevance. 3
and complementary to our efforts to examine whether the factors discussed by Soltwedel for Germany are also relevant for Austria. See also Blanchard et al (1985) , Blanchard and Summers (l987a) and (l987b) and Giersch (1983) .
3 The relevance of this experience to EMU is not beyond question, however. Decisions about the conduct of EMTJ monetary policy have not been taken. To the extent that it is the same as German policy or resembles policy in Germany, both with respect to achieving 2 Economic theory indicates that a country that pegs its currency to that of another country ties its nominal economic measures to those abroad; real economic activity can also be affected, however. For example, Cluck, Proske and Tatom (1992) The fourth section looks at such evidence for Belgium and the Netherlands.
The article concludes that coordination has not had an influence on the unemployment experience in these three countries.
I. SHOULD POLICY COORDINATION HAVE ADVERSE REAL CONSEQUENCES?
Tying domestic monetary policy to developments in an anchor country is not likely to be undertaken if adverse effects are expected, unless clearly-defined benefits are expected to offset these effects. In the case of pegging the exchange rate to an anchor currency, the principal benefit is expected to be the importation of the anchor country's lower domestic inflation rate. Suppose that the relationship between the unemployment rate and the inflation rate is initially that shown in figure 1. The picture is a stereotypical one based on an expectations-augmented view of the PC derived from the rational-expectations and natural rate hypotheses. In the short run, there is a trade-off between inflation and the unemployment indicted by the SR curve; its position is conditioned 5 Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) examine the effects of the exchange rate regime on the coefficients of the Phillips Curve. Salemi (1992) attempts to test and quantify the effects of several factors influencing the U.S. natural rate using a method similar to that below. Such efforts require the existence of a short-run PC. According to several of the studies in Brunner and Meltzer (1976), including Lucas (1976) , this is generally doubtful.
Such an existence problem is not apparent for the three countries studied here.
by the expected rate of inflation, which in figure 1 is assumed to be~.
In the long run, there is no A second source of a potentially permanent effect is that the PC can become flatter (or steeper).
If the slope of the PC becomes flatter, the level of unemployment associated with any given level of inflation and inflationary expectations becomes larger.
Consider the linear empirical model of the PC shown in figure 7:
(1)~t=fio+/3,Ut+/3 2~+ E where is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean an constant variance, o~. In the conventional model /~2 equals one and /3, is negative.
When actual and expected inflation are equal, the unemployment rate tends to equal (-/3~//3,) if /32 equals one, or [-j3~+ (1 -j~~)Pj//3,, if /32 does not equal one. Note that if /~2 is less than one, the unemployment rate where actual and anticipated inflation are equal is a decreasing function of inflation.
In figure 1 , the long-run PC is negatively-sloped in this case.
The parameter /3, measures the slope of the PC.
If it declines in absolute value, the level of unemployment associated with a given (~,~is 11 higher.
This can be ascertained by rewriting equation 1 to obtain:
A fall in absolute value of /3, will raise U if the unemployment is constrained to be positive; note that this also raises the natural rate of unemployment (/3o//~,). The parameter /3, measures the sensitivity of the inflation rate to a change in the domestic unemployment rate. This parameter would become smaller in a PC analysis if shifts in aggregate demand confront a flatter aggregate supply curve.
When a small country ties its monetary policy to maintain a given exchange rate, shocks to aggregate demand (or aggregate supply) might have little or no effect on domestic inflation, so that more pressure is put on domestic wages and, in the short-run for adverse demand shocks, on the unemployment rate. In this case, domestic inflation becomes largely or completely determined abroad, so that the PC becomes flatter or, in the limit, completely flat. In the Netherlands, the unemployment rate also rose following the peg but, again, by less than the unemployment rate rose in Germany. Also, as in Austria, Dutch and Belgian inflation fell following the peg and by more than it had in Germany. In Belgium, however, the unemployment rate fell following the peg, despite a rise in Germany. In this case, at least, the simple observation of post-peg experience is not consistent with the hypothesis. 10 The quarterly consumer price index data used here are seasonally adjusted using a Census X-ll program. Pagan (1984) indicates that a generated regressor problem arises from including the expected rate of inflation in the Phillips curve estimate.
All of the tests for shifts reported below were estimated replacing the expected rate of inflation with its lagged determinants indicated in the first-stage regression for the time series model of inflation.
Only one of the results differs from those reported below using this procedure.
This case is discussed in the text. This procedure corrects the residual variance estimate for the second-stage estimate according to Pagan. The test statistics were -10.96 for Austria, -9.24 for Belgium, and -7.95 for the Netherlands for the equations estimated over the period ending in IV/l992. The 5 percent critical value, according to Engel and Granger, is -3.37. effect and, while not significant in a two-tail test, it is statistically significant using a one-tail criterion (the critical value of the t-statistic is 1.66).
Evaluated at a sample mean of 3.2 percent inflation over the period (III/l98l-IV/l992) the natural rate estimate rises from 2.9 percent to 4.8 percent, according to this PC~Table 3 also reports the results for combinations of shifts in the parameters. In two of these four cases, one of the shift components (that for the unemployment rate slope) is statistically significant, but the reported F-statistics that the /3* terms are all zero fail to reject that they are; none of the F-statistics are statistically significant.
Since the Austrian PC appears to have shifted during the coordination period, it is possible that it became more sensitive to movements in German unemployment. Thus, it is important to test whether the source of the shift was, in fact, due to the Austrian PC becoming more sensitive to movements in German unemployment. In particular, the relation of 14 When three lagged values of the dependent variable are used in place of the expected rate of inflation, the same term D8l3~UA 6 is again the only statistically significant shift term (t = 2.26).
For this estimate, the Austrian unemployment rate coefficient shifts from -1.908 to -1.117 and the implicit natural rate at the mean inflation rate of 3.2 percent rises from 2.9 percent to 5 percent. /~o, /3,, /32 to the German unemployment rate after 11/1981 was tested using the hypothesized relationship:
(3) fl~= /3? + /3~D8l3 + /3~D8l3 UG~i = 0, 1, 2 where /3~has the same interpretation in equation 1, but its components include a pre-coordination value (fl~) and a shift that is a function of the German unemployment rate (UG~) (/3~+ /3**~UG~). Table 4 reports the estimates of the (f3~, /3**~) coefficients for the three /3's, including the estimates when thet erm, alone, is constrained to zero. Most of these effects are statistically insignificant, but there is again some evidence that the short-run response of inflation to changes in the unemployment rose, but the increase did not occur because this coefficient became a positive function of German unemployment. This is consistent with a rise in the Austrian natural rate in proportion to the unemployment rate in Germany. Note that /3**~is not statistically significant, however, when considered alone or jointly.
The evidence here rejects the hypothesis that the adoption of the fixed exchange rate peg to an anchor currency like the Mark has had adverse real economic consequences. Evidence is found that suggests that Austrian inflation became less sensitive to movements in the unemployment rate and that the natural unemployment rate was higher during the postpeg period. However, no significant shift, including this one, could be found which was related to movements in the German unemployment rate. Thus, it is not clear that Austria's unsatisfactory unemployment experience since the early l980s has been related to the German developments.
There is one remaining possibility raised above, however. It is the case that Austria's inflation rate has been lower since the peg; inflation averaged only 
